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Abstract
We study the eﬀects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of mone-
tary and debt policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate
unanticipated inﬂa t i o ni n c r e a s e st h ec o s to ft h eo u t s t a n d i n gd e b te v e ni fn ou n a n -
ticipated inﬂation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the
optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively
until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary
policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time
inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative
forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commitment to ﬁscal
policy.
Key words: Nominal debt; monetary policy; time-consistency; Markov-perfect
equilibrium.
JEL classiﬁcation: E40; E50; E63.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Fiscal discipline has often been seen as a precondition to sustain price stability. Such
is, for example, the rationale behind the Growth and Stability Pact in Europe. More
precisely, it is understood that an economy with a large stock of nominally denominated
government debt can beneﬁtf r o mi n ﬂation surprises that reduce the need for distor-
tionary taxation in the future. This means that optimal monetary policy under full
∗We would like to thank Jo´ se-Victor Ríos-Rull, Jaume Ventura, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Isabel
Correia for their comments, as well as the participants in seminars and conferences where this work
has been presented.
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1commitment (the Ramsey policy) can be time inconsistent. In other words, if a govern-
ment with the ability to honor its commitments were to re-optimize at a later date, it
may choose to deviate from its original plan. In this context, a constraint on the level
of debt may reduce the impact of such time-inconsistency distortions.
In this paper we study the eﬀects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice
of monetary and debt policy. We analyze a very stylized monetary model to show how
optimal monetary policy diﬀers depending on whether there is indexed or nominal debt
and on the degree of commitment of monetary authorities. The structure of the optimal
taxation problems that we solve is the following: ﬁrst, we assume that the government
has to ﬁnance a given constant ﬂow of expenditures with revenues levied using only
seigniorage. To solve these optimal taxation problems, the government chooses the paths
of seigniorage that maximize the household’s utility subject to the implementability
and budget constraints. Unexpected inﬂation is costly, because we assume that the
consumption good must be purchased with cash carried over from the previous period,
as in Svensson (1985). This timing of the cash-in-advance constraint implies that, if the
government decided to surprise the household with an unexpected increase in inﬂation in
any given period, the household’s consumption would be smaller than planned because
its predetermined cash balances would be insuﬃcient to purchase the intended amount
of consumption. When considering whether or not to carry out such a surprise inﬂation,
the government compares the reduction in the household’s current utility that results
from this lower level of consumption with the increase in the household’s future utility
that results from the reduction in future seigniorage.
After describing the model economy in Section 2, in Section 3 we characterize optimal
policy with full commitment, in the benchmark case where the outstanding stock of
government debt is indexed. Our results build on those of Nicolini (1998), who shows
that, when the utility function is logarithmic in consumption and linear in leisure and
the stock of government debt is indexed, the optimal monetary policy –in an economy
similar to ours– is to abstain from inﬂation surprises. This result follows from applying
optimal taxation principles and it means that, in this model economy, the solution to
the Ramsey problem is time consistent. The solution to this problem is stationary, and
there is a unique interest rate that balances the government budget.
Next we study the optimal monetary policy when the outstanding stock of gov-
ernment debt is nominal. In Section 4, we assume that there is full commitment to
monetary policy. We show that interest rates are kept constant from period one on-
wards, but that the initial interest rate is higher, since it is optimal to cancel part of the
inherited stock of nominal debt. In this case, after period zero, the interest rate is lower
than the one that obtains in the equilibrium with indexed debt, since the government
cannot reduce the inherited stock of debt by increasing the initial price. We characterize
the rational expectations Ramsey equilibrium in which there are no surprise inﬂations
even in period zero. This equilibrium has the property that initial real liabilities are the
same as in the case of indexed debt. Since there is no ‘free lunch’ surprise inﬂation, the
equilibrium that obtains with nominal debt and full commitment is less eﬃcient than
the time consistent equilibrium with indexed debt.
2With these regimes as reference, in Section 5 we present the main result of the paper.
We study optimal policy in the absence of commitment. In this case, we restrict our
attention to a Markov perfect equilibrium. We call this equilibrium recursive as in Cole
and Kehoe (1996) and Obstfeld (1997). Two interesting features of the optimal policy
under this recursive equilibrium are that the optimal inﬂation tax is non-stationary and
that it converges to the inﬂation tax that obtains when there is no government debt.
This result arises because, in the recursive equilibrium, it is optimal for the government
to asymptotically deplete the stock of nominal government debt. An implication of this
result is that, in this economy, the optimal nominal interest is initially higher than the
one prevailing when debt is indexed while, in the limit, it is lower. This decreasing path
for the nominal interest rate is another indication that nominal debt is indeed a burden
for monetary policy. Not only debt has to be serviced, but it also distorts interest
rates. In fact, it is because the optimal policy endogenizes these distortions that it
asymptotically monetizes the debt as the way to eliminate distortions. In Section 6,
we carry out a numerical example and we describe our ﬁndings comparing the diﬀerent
regimes.
In Section 7 we ask whether these results are robust to the introduction of additional
taxes. This is important since, in advanced economies, seigniorage is a minor source
of tax revenue and we would like to know if our results still hold when government
outlays are ﬁnanced with other taxes. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w es t u d yt h ec a s eo fc o n s u m p t i o n
taxes. We impose the natural assumption that taxes are chosen before the monetary
policy decisions are made. We ﬁnd that the same equilibria arise when there are both
seigniorage and consumption taxes as when there is only seigniorage. However, the
ﬁscal authority can constrain the monetary authority to follow the Friedman rule, of
zero nominal rates, from the outset. In this case, since monetary distortions resulting in
negative interest rates are not equilibrium rates, the monetary authority has no incentive
to monetize the debt and, as a result, implements the optimal equilibrium that obtains
with indexed debt (see Marimon, Nicolini and Teles, 2003).
The relationship between ﬁscal and monetary policy has been addressed in the un-
pleasant monetarist arithmetic literature of Sargent and Wallace (1981) ,a n di nt h eﬁscal
theory of the price level of Sims (1994) and Woodford (1996). In these approaches, how-
ever, policies are taken to be exogenous. This is not the case in our analysis, nor in the
related work of Chari and Kehoe (1999), Rankin (2002) and Obstfeld (1997). These last
two papers are the closest to ours. Both, however, assume that debt is real and only
focus on monetary policy. They aim at characterizing the Markov perfect equilibrium
when the source of the time inconsistency of monetary policy is related to the depletion
of the real value of money balances. This source of time inconsistency is ambiguous:
while in Lucas and Stokey (1983) the government would want to completely deplete
the outstanding money balances, in Svensson (1985)’s set up, as was shown in Nicol-
ini (1998), under certain elasticity conditions, the government problem would be time
consistent. This ambiguity led Obstfeld (1997) to consider an ad-hoc cost of a surprise
inﬂation. Our analysis diﬀers from Obstfeld’s both because we consider nominal debt
and because, in our model economy, the cost of unanticipated inﬂation arises from the
timing of the cash-in-advance constraint rather than being imposed ad-hoc. In a similar
3framework, Rankin (2002) shows that the size of the initial debt matters for the direc-
tion of the time inconsistency problem, but he does not provide a full characterization
of the resulting dynamic equilibrium. He shows that, for general preferences, there can
be a value of debt where the elasticity is unitary and, therefore, there exists a steady
state with positive debt.
Finally, an additional contribution of this paper is the full characterization and the
computation of the optimal policy in a recursive equilibrium with a state variable. In
this respect, our work is closely related to the recent work of Krusell, Martín and Ríos-
Rull (2003) who characterize recursive equilibria in the context of an optimal labor
taxation problem.
2 The model economy
In our model economy there is a representative household and a government. The
government issues currency, M
g
t+1, and nominal debt, B
g
t+1,t oﬁnance an exogenous and
constant level of public consumption, g. Initially, we abstract from all other sources of










where it is the nominal interest rate paid on debt issued by the government at time
t − 1,a n dpt is the price of one unit of the date t composite good. The initial stock of
currency, M
g
0, and initial debt liabilities, B
g
0(1 +i0), are given. A government policy is,




t+1,g} for t ≥ 0.
We assume that the household’s preferences over consumption and labor can be




t[u(ct) − αnt] (2)
where ct > 0 denotes consumption at time t, nt denotes labor at time t,a n d0 < β < 1
is the time discount factor. We assume that the utility of consumption satisﬁes the
standard assumptions of being strictly increasing and strictly concave. For reasons that
will become clear below, in most of this article we assume that the utility is logarithmic
in consumption, i.e., u(c)=l o g ( c).
We assume that consumption in period t must be purchased using currency car-
ried over from period t − 1 as in Svensson (1985). This timing of the cash-in-advance
constraint implies that the representative household takes both M0 and B0(1 + i0) as
given when solving its maximization problem, and it is crucial to obtain the results
4that we report here. The speciﬁc form of the cash-in-advance constraint faced by the
representative household is:
ptct ≤ Mt (3)
for every t ≥ 0.
To simplify the productive side of this economy, we assume that labor can be trans-
formed into either the private consumption good or the public consumption good on a
one-to-one basis. Consequently, the competitive equilibrium real wage is w∗
t =1 ,a n d
the economy’s resource constraint is:
ct + g ≤ nt (4)
both for every t ≥ 0.
Each period the representative household also faces the following budget constraint:
Mt+1 + Bt+1 ≤ Mt − ptct + Bt(1 + it)+ptnt (5)
where Mt+1 and Bt+1 denote, respectively, the currency and the stock of nominal gov-
ernment debt that the household carries over from period t to period t +1 .






2.1 A competitive equilibrium






t=0,a na l l o c a t i o n{Mt+1,B t+1,c t,n t}∞







0(1 + i0), the government policy and the price vector satisfy the
government budget constraint described in expression (1);
(ii) when households take M0, B0(1 + i0) and the price vector as given, the allocation
maximizes the problem described in expression (2), subject to the cash-in-advance
constraint described in expression (3), the household budget constraint described
in expression (5), and the no-Ponzi games condition described in expression (6);
and
5(iii) the price vector is such that all markets clear, that is: M
g
t = Mt, B
g
t = Bt,
and g and {ct,n t}∞
t=0 satisfy the economy’s resource constraint described in expres-
sion (4), for every t ≥ 0.
When the debt is indexed, outstanding government liabilities are ﬁx e di nr e a lt e r m s .
Let bt+1 = B
g
t+1/pt b et h er e a lv a l u eo ft h ee n d - o f - p e r i o ds t o c ko fd e b t .A competitive






t=0, an allocation {Mt+1,b t+1,c t,n t}∞
t=0,a n dap r i c ev e c t o r ,{pt,i t+1}∞
t=0,s u c h
that the corresponding (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisﬁed when nominal liabilities are replaced





Given our assumptions on the utility of consumption u, it is straightforward to show
that the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy satisﬁes both the economy’s
resource constraint (4) and the household’s budget constraint (5) with equality, and
that the ﬁrst order conditions of the Lagrangian of the household’s problem are both
necessary and suﬃcient to characterize the solution to the household’s problem. Fur-
thermore, it is also straightforward to show that, when it+1 > 0, the cash-in-advance
constraint (3) is binding.
The competitive equilibrium allocation of an economy with nominal debt can be












the government budget constraint (1), the resource constraint (4), and the no-Ponzi
games condition (6).
These conditions imply that the intertemporal government budget constraint de-














The competitive equilibrium allocation of an economy with indexed debt is also
completely characterized by (7), (8) and (9) with (8) –and, correspondingly, (7)— also
being satisﬁed in period zero (i.e., for t = −1). In other words, when debt is indexed
6and pt−1 is given, the government policy must be such that it adjusts to pt in order
to satisfy Fisher’s equation even in period zero. The present value budget government
constraint is the same as (10) in its revenue side, while its liabilities are given in real








Therefore, in order to make meaningful comparisons, we will confront an indexed
debt economy with initial liabilities b0β
−1 with a nominal debt economy for which its
real liabilities
B0(1+i0)
p0 are equal to b0β
−1 in equilibrium.
3 Optimal policy with indexed debt
In this section we study the optimal policy when the stock of government debt is indexed
(I). This is the benchmark against which we compare the optimal policy that obtains
when the stock of government debt is nominal –that is, not indexed– which is the
m a i nf o c u so ft h i sa r t i c l e .
In the model economy with indexed government debt, the deﬁnition of an optimal
monetary equilibrium is the following
Deﬁnition 2 For a given level of government expenditures, g, and initial values of cur-
rency, M0, and real government debt, b0, an optimal monetary equilibrium with indexed
debt (I) is a government policy, a price vector, and an implied allocation, such that: (i)
the household utility is maximized, (ii) the government policy, the allocation, and the
price vector are a competitive equilibrium with indexed debt.
We follow the standard implementability approach of letting the government choose
the allocation directly. That is, we use expressions (7), (8), and (9) and the equilibrium
conditions M
g
t = Mt and B
g









t in expression (1).
Consequently, the household’s utility is maximized when the government chooses
the policy that implements the consumption and real debt sequences that maximize





+ bt+1 = ct + btβ
−1 + g, t ≥ 0 (11)
and the no -Ponzi games condition (6).
This problem is recursive only when u(c)=l n ( c). In this case, the price elasticity
is unitary and, as Nicolini (1998) has shown, the optimal monetary policy is time-
consistent. This problem can be written recursively as follows:
V (b)=m a x




0 = c + β




The ﬁrst order condition for c is:
1
c
− α = −βV
0(b
0) (14)
The interpretation of this equation is that the marginal gain of increasing consumption











c0 − α (16)
which implies that the optimal level of consumption, c∗
I, is constant and equal to:
c
∗






Notice that expression (15) implies that the real value of the government debt is sta-
tionary and, consequently, that b∗
I = b0.





















4 Optimal policy with nominal debt and full com-
mitment
In this section we study the optimal monetary policy that obtains when the outstanding
stock of government is nominal –i.e., not indexed– and the government can fully
1Notice that this last equality has been obtained from expressions (7), (8) and (9).
8commit to the Ramsey monetary policy (R) after a given initial period that we denote
by t =0 . When the stock of debt is not indexed, the fact that consumption must be
purchased with currency carried over from the previous period, implies that seigniorage
at t =0is a tax that can be levied without aﬀecting the commitment to future interest
rates. This may create an incentive for a Ramsey government to increase the initial
seigniorage tax at t =0 , and to use its proceeds to reduce the outstanding stock of debt.
Rational forward-looking households are aware of this incentive and, therefore, they
would have anticipated it when making their previous period decisions. In terms of the
initial level of consumption, this implies that the resulting optimal c0 must have been
correctly anticipated by the households or, equivalently, that the ex-ante and the ex-post
real interest rates must coincide in a rational expectations equilibrium (see Chari and
Kehoe, 1999).










Using the optimality conditions (7), (8), and (9) and the deﬁnition of b1, expression (19)
c a nb er e w r i t t e na s :











When debt is nominal, a fully committed Ramsey government would choose the value
of c0 = c∗
R,0 that maximizes the representative household utility subject to (20), and
the additional implementability constraints, one for each t>0,t h a tw ed e s c r i b eb e l o w .
This optimal choice would result in p∗
R,0 = M0/c∗




R,0 = b0(1 + r∗
R,0), where r∗
R,0 is the ex-post real interest rate that is
consistent with c0 = c∗
R,0.














That is, p0 is the price that satisﬁes Fisher’s equation (8) in period zero, and c0 is the
optimal consumption plan for t =0that is consistent with an initial real interest rate
r0 = β
−1.
Now we impose the additional consistency condition that p0 = p0 in equilibrium. In
other words, we impose the condition that the decisions taken in the past must satisfy an
ex-post, rational expectations, consistency condition in period zero. This requires that
there must be a ﬁxed point between expectations and realizations –or, equivalently,
between the ex-ante and the ex-post real interest rates– implicitly deﬁned by c0 = c0.
9Notice that imposing this additional consistency restriction in period zero prevents
the “free lunches” that would result from surprise inﬂations, and allows us to compare
the optimal policies that obtain in model economies with indexed debt and those in
model economies with nominal debt. We can compare equilibria that result under
diﬀerent regimes having the same initial real government liabilities.2
Deﬁnition 3 A full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with nominal debt (R) is a
competitive equilibrium with nominal debt and a value for the expected consumption at
time t =0 , c0, that satisfy the following conditions:





t [log(ct) − α(ct + g)] (22)
subject to the implementability constraints





γ + bt+1 − ct − β
−1bt =0 ,f o rt ≥ 1 (24)
(ii) c0 = c0.





















R,1,f o rt ≥ 1. (26)
Notice that, as long as b0 > 0, c∗






















2Notice that, when the utility function is logarithmic in consumption, there is a one-to-one mapping
between initial conditions (B0,M 0) and b0. Speciﬁcally, b0β
−1 = B0/(αM0). This follows from the
equalities (1 + i0)/p0 =( 1+i0)c0/M0 =1 /(αM0).









It is useful to compare the full commitment Ramsey equilibrium allocation with the
one that obtains when debt is indexed, since indexed debt can be viewed as an extreme
form of commitment. The full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with nominal debt is
characterized by an ex-post nominal interest rate higher than the one resulting in the
optimal equilibrium with indexed debt in period t =0 , and lower afterwards.
The reason for this is that the government wants to take advantage of the lump-sum
character of monetizing part of the outstanding stock of nominal debt, since there is
no time zero indexation that the government must internalize. In other words, in our
economy with unitary price elasticity (u(c)=l n ( c)), nominal debt adjusts less than
one-to-one to any price change. It follows that to cancel part of the stock of nominal
debt in the initial period is part of the optimal tax policy. This is because in the full
commitment Ramsey equilibrium expectations are given and the initial price increase
does not question the commitment to the new optimal monetary policy.
When the stock of debt is indexed, the ﬁrst order condition (16) requires that the
marginal values of consumption are equated, even in period zero. In contrast, when the
stock of debt is nominal and there is full commitment, the ﬁrst order condition (25)
shows that the marginal value of consumption in period zero is discounted, since a
marginal reduction in c0,r e s u l t si nal o w e rb1.
Moreover, notice that, for any given b0, the indexed debt solution, c∗
I, is a feasible
solution for a fully committed Ramsey planner.3 However, when debt is nominal debt,
the fully committed Ramsey planner has an additional taxation instrument, namely to
monetize part of the outstanding stock of debt, and c∗
I is not a best reply to the expec-
tations c0 = c∗
I. As it often happens with Nash equilibria, the fact that the government
has an additional taxation instrument does not imply that the Ramsey equilibrium that
obtains when the stock of debt is nominal (i.e., c0 = c∗
R,0)i sm o r ee ﬃcient than the
equilibrium that obtains when the stock of debt is indexed. In fact, as the following
proposition states, the converse is true.
Proposition 4 Assume u(c)=l o g ( c). Then, for any given b0 > 0, the optimal policy
that obtains in an equilibrium with indexed debt is more eﬃcient than the optimal policy
that obtains in a full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with nominal debt.
Proof. It is enough to show that the household’s value obtained in the full commitment
Ramsey equilibrium is lower than the value achieved in the equilibrium with indexed

























Since preferences are linear in labor and strictly concave in consumption, the above






































5 Optimal policy with nominal debt and no com-
mitment
When the government cannot commit to its monetary policy, the incentive to monetize
part of the debt discussed in the previous section arises every period and, consequently,
the price level each period becomes a function pt = p(bt,M t). Since the representative
household has rational expectations, it takes as given the government policy function.
Furthermore, its expected future prices, ¯ pt, are formed in period t−1, and they are the
same function of the state of the economy at the beginning of period t, i.e. ¯ pt = p(bt,M t).
Consequently, in this case, the nominal interest rate will satisfy the following version








The implementability condition which, in general, can be written as:









12And, since from the cash-in-advance constraint we have that ct = Mt/pt and, conse-
quently, that ct = Mt/pt, it can be rewritten as:




Notice that, once again, the optimal policy problem can be written as a recursive
dynamic program with a single state variable bt.S p e c i ﬁcally, the government has to
ﬁnd a policy, c = C (b), that solves the following problem:








and C (b)=C (b).
Deﬁnition 5 A recursive monetary equilibrium for this economy (M) is a value function
V (b), policy functions {C∗(b),b ∗(b)},a n daf u n c t i o nC(b) such that:
(i) Given function C(b), the value function and the policy functions solve the problem
described in (34) and (35), and
(ii) C∗(b)=C(b)
To characterize the recursive monetary equilibrium, notice that the ﬁrst order con-
ditions of the problem described in expressions (34) and (35) are, ﬁrst:
1
c









This condition equates the marginal gain of one additional unit of consumption to its
marginal cost associated with higher debt needed to ﬁnance this consumption, plus the
additional debt that results from the lower current period price level.






















where ²c(b) is the elasticity of function C (b). That is, the marginal increase of bt has
value V 0(bt), but the corresponding increase of bt+1 has two components, the direct eﬀect
of increasing the stock of debt –as in the indexed debt case– and the indirect eﬀect
that arises from the fact that higher values of debt are associated with higher interest
rates, ²c(b) ≤ 0. This higher costs arise because a larger stock of nominal debt increases
the incentive to monetize the debt and, along a rational expectations equilibrium path,
these additional distortions are anticipated.






























i [1 − ²c(b
0)] (40)
In contrast with expression (16), characterizing the optimal policy with indexed debt,
where the marginal values of consumption are simply equated, expression (40) shows
that in a recursive monetary equilibrium with nominal debt, the marginal values of
consumption must be discounted, since a higher consumption means a lower price and,
therefore, higher debt in the future.
Recall that, this discounting already showed up when the fully committed Ramsey
planner evaluated the marginal value of consumption in period zero according to ex-
pression (25). Now, the uncommitted recursive planner reoptimizes every period and,
therefore, the marginal values of consumption must be discounted every period, as long
as there is outstanding debt.
Condition (40) also shows that the discounted marginal values of consumption are
distorted further by the incentive to increase the current price that arises when the
end-of-period stock of debt, b0, is positive: [1 − ²c(bt+1)].
In the previous section we have shown that the optimal policy with indexed debt
is more eﬃc i e n tt h a nt h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yf o l l o w e db yaf u l l yc o m m i t t e dR a m s e yp l a n -
ner. That the latter is more eﬃcient than the optimal policy in a non-commitment
recursive monetary equilibrium follows from the standard argument of comparing the
commitment and non-commitment policies achieved with the same tax instruments and
rational expectations consistency conditions. Namely, the Ramsey planner can choose
the recursive equilibrium allocation –satisfying the required consistency condition–
but the recursive equilibrium allocation is dominated by the Ramsey equilibrium allo-
cation.
146 Numerical solutions
To carry out our numerical example, we use the following values for the model economy
parameters: α =0 .45, β =0 .98, b0 =0 .17865 and g =0 .00822. Notice that our period
corresponds to a year and that we choose a very high level of nominal debt in relation to
government expenditures (b ' 22g). As we will see, results for lower values of the initial
stock of debt can be obtained from our calculations. The results that we obtain for the
time paths of the stocks of debt, nominal interest rates, and consumption in the three
cases analyzed in the previous sections are reported in Figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
The optimal monetary policy with indexed debt is stationary, while this is not the
case when debt is nominal (see Figure 2). When the debt is indexed, its stock is time-
invariant, while when the debt is nominal, it is optimal to reduce the initial stock. Under
full commitment this reduction is only carried out in the ﬁrst period, while under no
commitment, the stock of debt is depleted progressively until it is completely cancelled
(see Figure 1).
The long-run interest rate that obtains when debt is indexed is higher than those
that obtain when debt is nominal. In this latter case, the long-run interest rate under
full commitment is higher than the one that obtains when there is no commitment (see
Figure 2).
Finally, when we compare the welfare levels in the three diﬀerent regimes, we ﬁnd
that the value of the optimal consumption path is highest in the economy with indexed
debt and no taxes. In particular, the value of the optimal consumption is 0.012%
smaller when there is nominal debt and full commitment, and 0.133% smaller when
there is nominal debt and no commitment.
The algorithm used to compute the solution is described in the Appendix and the
code that implements the algorithm can be obtained from the ﬁrst author upon request.
7 Additional taxes
In most advanced economies, seigniorage is a minor source of revenue, and government
liabilities are ﬁnanced mostly with consumption and income taxes. This leads us to
generalize our model economy to include consumption taxes, τ.4 In this economy, a
ﬁscal policy is a sequence {τt}∞
t=0.
We make the natural assumption that tax policy precedes monetary policy; tax rates
are announced at the beginning of the period, before the monetary policy decisions are
made. That is, given the current state of the economy (bt,M t,t),t h eﬁscal authority
chooses τt = τ(bt,M t,t) and then the monetary authority chooses pt = p(bt,M t,τt,t).
4As it will become clear from our analysis, the introduction of other taxes does not change the
nature of the main results reported in this section.
15In this section we ﬁrst study the case of an arbitrary ﬁscal policy that allows the
monetary policy to adapt to it optimally choosing a path of nonnegative interest rates.
Next we study the case in which the ﬁscal authority can fully commit to an optimal
p o l i c y ,a n dw es h o wt h a ti sp a r to fs u c hp o l i c yt oﬁnance all the outstanding govern-
ment liabilities with the consumption tax, and to constrain the monetary authority to
implement a zero nominal interest rate.
7.1 The model economy with consumption taxes





t [u(ct) − αnt] (41)
subject to:
pt(1 + τt)ct ≤ Mt (42)




















These conditions must hold for every t ≥ 0. Notice that expression (45) reﬂects the
fact that the household makes its plans based on its expectations about both interest
16rates and taxes. The intertemporal condition (46) is exactly the same as expression
(45)5 and the cash-in-advance constraint (47) now includes consumption taxes.










and the feasibility condition (4) does not change.
7.2 Optimal monetary policy when the ﬁscal authority moves
ﬁrst
We now consider the general case in which: (i)t h eﬁscal authority moves ﬁrst and its
policy rule is τt = τ(bt,M t,t);( ii) the monetary authority moves last and its policy rule
is pt = p(bt,M t,τt,t),a n d( iii) the household makes its plans in period t − 1 based on
expectations pt = p(bt,M t,τt,t). Speciﬁcally we assume that for all t ≥ 0, the following








planned consumption ¯ ct satisﬁes (45), and the cash-in-advance constraint (47) is satisﬁed
with equality for it > 0.
With this general formulation, when the stock of debt is indexed, pt = pt must be
satisﬁed for all t ≥ 0. When the stock of debt is nominal and the monetary authority
is fully committed, pt = pt must be satisﬁed for all t ≥ 1, while p0 = p0 must be
satisﬁed only in equilibrium. Finally, when the stock of debt is nominal and there is
no commitment to monetary policy, pt = pt,m u s tb es a t i s ﬁed for all t ≥ 0 only in
equilibrium.





+ bt+1 = btβ
−1ct
¯ ct
+ ct + g (50)
which, when the utility of consumption is logarithmic, simpliﬁes to:




5Notice that when the government uses labor taxes, τn





t ) and, therefore, the equilibrium nominal interest rate will be aﬀected by ﬁscal
policy. As far as our results are concerned, this change makes a diﬀerence only when the stock of debt
is indexed debt and the ﬁscal authority is not fully committed.
17Notice that this expression is exactly the same as expression (33).
Now the following additional restrictions must be satisﬁed: (i) when the stock of
debt is indexed, ct
¯ ct =1must be satisﬁed for all t ≥ 0 along any path (i.e. both in and
out of equilibrium); (ii) when the stock of debt is nominal and there is full commitment
to monetary policy, ct
¯ ct =1must be satisﬁed for all t ≥ 1 along any path, while c0
¯ c0 =1
is only a Ramsey equilibrium restriction; and (iii) when the stock of debt is nominal
and there is no commitment to monetary policy, ct
¯ ct =1for all t ≥ 0 is only a recursive
equilibrium restriction.
Consequently, the monetary authority faces the same problem with consumption
taxes than the one faced when there was only seigniorage, for any level of monetary
commitment. Therefore, the allocations that obtain for the various types of debt and
monetary policy commitment technologies are exactly the same as those that obtained
before. This result is established in the following subsections:
Consumption taxes and indexed debt. In this case policies are stationary and we





b0 d e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n3 .
Notice, however that now interest rates ˜ ıt = i(bt,τt) are set as to satisfy:6
u0(c∗)
α
=[ 1+i(bt,τt)](1 + τt) (52)
And when the stock of debt is indexed the time-invariant equilibrium nominal interest
rate is:














Where, as we have already mentioned, we assume that ˜ ıI(b0,τt) ≥ 0. The equilibrium






Consumption taxes, nominal debt and full commitment to monetary policy.














¤−1 d e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n4 .
Now, the equilibrium interest rates are
˜ ıR,0 =˜ ıR(b0,τ0,0) = [αc
∗
0(1 + τ0)]
−1 − 1 (54)
and
˜ ıR,t =˜ ıR(bt,τt,t)=[ αc
∗
1(1 + τt)]
−1 − 1 (55)
6Henceforth we use tildes to distinguish the variables of the model economy with consumption taxes
from the corresponding variables of the model economy without consumption taxes.
18for all t ≥ 1,a n dw h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tw i t h˜ ıR(bt,τt,t) ≥ 0 for all t.
Finally, the intertemporal condition between interest rates in period zero –that
corresponds to expression (29)– is
(1 +˜ ıR,0)(1 + τ0) − 1
1+( 1+˜ ıR,0)(1 + τ0) B0
M0
=( 1+˜ ıR,1)(1 + τ1) − 1 (56)
Consumption taxes, nominal debt and no commitment to monetary policy.
In this case policies are also stationary and we obtain the recursive equilibrium allocation













¤ [1 − ²c(b
0)] (57)
It follows that in the economy with nominal debt and no commitment to monetary
policy, the path of depletion of the stock of debt in real terms coincides with the one
characterized in Section 5 and computed in Section 6 even though the consumption tax
revenues would allow for a faster debt depletion rate.
7.3 Optimal ﬁscal policy with commitment
In the three regimes discussed in the previous section exactly how the equilibrium allo-
cations are supported is indeterminate since the household only cares about the eﬀective
nominal rate of return, (1 + i)(1+τ). For instance, it is always possible to set taxes
in a way that the resulting monetary policy follows the Friedman rule of zero nominal
interest rates even though in our economy there is no eﬃciency gain from following such
ar u l e . 7 More precisely, as long as monetary responses to realized ﬁscal policies result in
non-negative interest rates, ﬁscal policy is not eﬀective in this economy since the mon-
etary authority can adapt to any ﬁscal policy in order to support the allocation that
obtained in the economy without consumption taxes. Moreover, such adaptation is the
optimal policy in every case. But this may not be the only scenario in which monetary
authorities operate.
To see this, suppose that the stock of debt is nominal and that there is full com-
mitment to monetary policy. Let the ﬁscal authority set τ(bt,M t,t)=τ∗(b0), where
7This may not be true in a more general model economy. For instance, this is not true if we introduce
a distinction between cash and credit goods. In this case, the Friedman rule would eliminate the distor-
tion between cash and credit goods created by the cash-in-advance constraint. This notwithstanding,
the distortions introduced by the presence of a positive stock of nominal debt would still be there, just
as in the economy with only cash goods.
19τ∗(b0) corresponds to the tax rate that fully ﬁnances the government liabilities in the














If the monetary authority tries to monetize part of the existing stock of nominal debt
and to use the resulting revenues to increase future consumption —say, maintaining
a constant c1— then, it must be the case that c0 <c ∗ <c 1. But such allocation
requires that (1 +˜ ıR,0)(1 + τ∗(b0)) > (1 + τ∗(b0)) > (1 +˜ ıR,1)(1 + τ∗(b0)) which implies
˜ ıR,0 > 0 > ˜ ıR,1. However negative interest rates cannot be an equilibrium in this
economy since then the household would like to borrow unboundly. Therefore, given
that it is not possible to raise future consumption with negative taxes, there is no gain
in partially monetizing the stock of nominal debt in period zero. It follows that, if the
ﬁscal authority wants to maximize expression (2), it will set τ(bt,M t,t)=τ∗(b0).T h e
same argument applies when there is no commitment to monetary policy.8 The following
proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 6 Assume that ﬁscal authorities maximize the welfare of the representative
household and can fully commit to their policies. Then the equilibrium allocation is the
optimal equilibrium allocation that obtains when the stock of debt is indexed, regardless
of the nature of the debt and independently of the degree of commitment of the monetary
authority.
8 Concluding comments
This paper discusses the diﬀerent ways in which nominal and indexed debt aﬀect the
sequential choice of optimal monetary and debt policies in a general equilibrium mon-
etary model where the costs of an unanticipated inﬂation arise from a cash-in-advance
constraint with the timing as in Svensson (1985) and government expenditures are exoge-
neous. In our environment, as in Nicolini (1998), when the utility function is logarithmic
in consumption and linear in leisure and debt is indexed, there is no time-inconsistency
problem. In this case, the optimal monetary policy is to maintain the initial level of
indexed debt, independently of the level of commitment of a Ramsey government.
I nc o n t r a s t ,f o rt h es a m es p e c i ﬁcation of preferences, when the initial stock of govern-
ment debt is nominally denominated a time inconsistency problem arises. In this case,
the government is tempted to inﬂate away its nominal debt liabilities. When the gov-
ernment cannot commit to its planned policies, the optimal sequential policy consists
in progressively depleting the outstanding stock of debt, so that it converges asymp-
totically to zero. Optimal nominal interest rates in this case are also decreasing, and
converge to zero, as long as there is no need to use seigniorage to ﬁnance government
8Marimon, Nicolini, and Teles (2003) make a similar argument.
20expenditures diﬀerent from debt servicing. Hence, the optimal monetary policy in this
economy coincides in the long term with the one that obtains in an economy which has
no outstanding debt and from which these time-inconsistency distortions are obviously
absent.
Such equilibrium path is not chosen when the initial stock of government debt is
nominally denominated and the government can fully commit to its planned policies.
In this case, it is optimal to increase the inﬂation tax in the ﬁrst period and to keep a
lower and constant inﬂation tax from there on.
We show that in the rational expectations equilibria, for a given initial level of
outstanding debt, the most eﬃcient equilibrium is the one that obtains when debt is
indexed, the equilibrium with nominal debt and full commitment comes second, and
the equilibrium with nominal debt and no commitment is the least eﬃcient. This result
highlights the sense in which nominal debt is indeed a burden on optimal monetary
policy.
It should be noted that the source of the ineﬃciencies and of the monetary policy
distortions discussed in this paper is not the desire to run a soft budgetary policy that
increases the debt liabilities of the government. Every policy discussed in this article is
an optimal policy, subject to the appropriate institutional and commitment constraints,
and is implemented by a benevolent and far-sighted government who does not face
either uncertainty or the need for public investments and who would, therefore, prefer
to reduce debt liabilities. The source of the ineﬃciencies is the distortion created by
the lack of commitment when there is an outstanding stock of nominal debt. Therefore,
our results highlight the need to implement policy and institutional arrangements that
either guarantee high commitment levels or that reduce the allowed levels of nominal
debt. However, they also show that a constraint on deﬁcits may be ineﬀective to reduce
the distortions created by nominal debt since they are independent of the size of the
deﬁcits.
The introduction of additional forms of taxation further clariﬁes the interplay be-
tween the various forms of debt and commitment possibilities. Under the natural as-
sumption that monetary choices are made after the tax rates have been decided, we
show that the equilibrium allocations obtained when we introduce consumption taxes
are the same as those obtained when there is only seigniorage, provided there is enough
seigniorage as to allow for an optimal monetary policy with non negative interest rates.
However, as in Marimon, Nicolini and Teles (2003), if there is full commitment to an
optimal ﬁscal policy, the ﬁscal authorities, anticipating monetary policy distortions,
choose to fully ﬁnance government liabilities and the resulting monetary policy is the
Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates and, as a result, the eﬃcient equilibrium
that obtains in the economy with indexed debt.
In summary, we show that ﬁscal discipline may be needed to achieve eﬃciency and
price stability, even when monetary authorities pursue optimal policies. However, our
analysis shows that ﬁscal discipline applies to the level of the debt and not to the level
of the deﬁcit or, alternatively, to the issuing of indexed debt. In contrast, for reasons
21beyond the scope of this paper, the use of nominal government debt and of ‘constraints
on ﬁscal deﬁcits’ (as in the EU Growth and Stability Pact) is widespread.
References
[1] Chari, V.V. and Patrick J. Kehoe. 1999. “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy”, National
Bureau of Economic Research, WP 6891, January.
[2] Cole, Harold and Timothy Kehoe, 1996, “A self-fulﬁlling model of Mexico’s 1994-1995
debt crisis”, Journal of International Economics,4 1, 309-330.
[3] Krusell, Per, Fernando Martín and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2003, “On the Determination
of Government Debt,” work in progress.
[4] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. and Nancy L. Stokey, 1983, “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Theory
in an Economy without Capital”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 55-93.
[5] Marimon, Ramon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles, 2003, “Inside-Outside Money
Competition,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50:8.
[6] Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1998, “More on the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Monetary Pol-
icy”, Journal of Monetary Economics
[7] Obstfeld Maurice, 1997, “Dynamic Seigniorage Theory”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 588-
614.
[8] Rankin, Neil, 2002, “Time Consistency and Optimal Inﬂation-Tax Smoothing: Is There
Really a Deﬂation Bias?, mimeo, University of Warwick.
[9] Sargent, Thomas, J. and Neil Wallace, 1981, “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,”
Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve bank of Minneapolis, 5,3, 1-17. [Reprinted, 1993, in
Rational Expectations and Inﬂation, 2nd ed., New York, Harper Collins].
[10] Sims,Christopher A., 1994, “A Simple Model for the Study of the Determination
of the Price Level and the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy,” Economic
Theory 4, 381—399.
[11] Svensson, L.E.O., 1985, “Money and Asset Prices in a Cash-in-Advance Economy”, Jour-
nal of Political Economy,9 3 ,9 19—944.
[12] Woodford, Michael. 1996. “Control of the Public Debt: A Requirement for Price Stabil-
ity?”, NBER Working Paper 5684
22Appendix: Computation
In order to compute the recursive monetary equilibrium deﬁned in Section 5, we must
solve the following dynamic program:
V (b)=m a x











for a given C (b).
However, computational considerations lead us to solve the following transformed prob-
lem:
V (x)=m a x









for a given ˆ C (b) and where x = b/β ˆ C(x).
In order to solve this problem we use the following algorithm:
• Step 1:D e ﬁne a discrete grid on x
• Step 2: Deﬁne a decreasing discrete function ˆ C0(x)
• Step 3: Iterate on the Bellman operator described in equations (35) and (62) until
we ﬁnd the converged V ∗(x), x0∗(x),c∗(x)
• Step 4: If c∗(x)= ˆ C0(x), we are done. Else, let ˆ C0(b)=c∗(b) and go to Step 3.
Finally, to recover the policy functions of the original problem we undo the transfor-
mation as follows: From x = b/β ˆ C(x),w eo b t a i nt h a tˆ b(x)=βx ˆ C(x),w h i c hc a nb e
computed directly from the solution to the transformed problem described above. Next
we invert ˆ b(x) and we obtain x = ˆ b−1(b). Finally, we use this expression to obtain
C(b)= ˆ C[ˆ b−1(b)] and b0(b)=ˆ b{x0[ˆ b−1(b)]}.
23Figure 1: The optimal stocks of indexed debt and of nominal debt with full commitment













21Figure 2: The optimal paths of nominal interest rates with indexed debt and with













22Figure 3: The optimal paths of consumption with indexed debt and with nominal debt
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